Always look for Mike Duncan's "Entropy of Victory" - whatever conflict a coalition puts to rest to achieve a common goal, will eventually be the source of its collapse.
Accordingly, Putin's alliance between thuggish secularist oligarchs and the orthodox church seems to be the putative main fault line here. The oligarchs don't particularly care about the church's regressive social politics, and the church can't be happy about the oligarchs crushing everyday Russians' ability to lead traditional family lives.
However, what's key here is to observe that EoV doesn't inherently dictate that the two factions will immediately turn on each other in mechanistic fashion.
Once Putin dies, there'll be an interim leader - whoever the immediate successor is under their [admittedly "mostly-honored-in-the-breach"] constitution. However long there is until the next election will determine how long that leader has to try to consolidate power using the state apparatus Putin has assembled. If there's a leader in the intelligence services who's particularly ambitious, they'll have a decent shot at temporarily securing power, though it might backfire on them - Putin was always an outlier among KBG alums in terms of his savvy at electoral politics. Medvedev may attempt a comeback as well, ushering Putin's United Russia into a new marriage between oligarchs and liberals, and ceding the church's support to Navalny, with the main electoral fight being over who gets to claim the mantle of nationalism. Regardless, the entire next election will basically hinge on how well the establishment is able to hold Alexei Navalny at bay - whether through outright assassination, propaganda suppression, or -- gasp -- honest retail politics!! (lol)
Basically, though, Russia won't have much of a constitutional crisis per se; it's just that the major institutions of state will be temporarily up for grabs - media, parliament, the security services, the oligarchs, the church, nationalism.
The only chance for a real "breakup" is if the various federally autonomous regions like Siberia seize the opportunity to demand *more* autonomy; however, absent Putin sucking up all the political oxygen in the room, they're just as likely to see if they can finally gain a foothold in Russia's core institutions. They're equally liable to join the church's or the oligarchs' side: the hinterlands are of course plenty traditional, but they may see the real route to power being with the oligarchs. They may even end up being the kingmaker faction; they won't have any formal party, so any coalition-formation negotiations will occur before/during the election as their leading candidates and/or incumbents for the Duma declare for either side.
From The Comments: Russian Breakups
From The Comments: Russian Breakups
From The Comments: Russian Breakups
(source link)
Always look for Mike Duncan's "Entropy of Victory" - whatever conflict a coalition puts to rest to achieve a common goal, will eventually be the source of its collapse.
Accordingly, Putin's alliance between thuggish secularist oligarchs and the orthodox church seems to be the putative main fault line here. The oligarchs don't particularly care about the church's regressive social politics, and the church can't be happy about the oligarchs crushing everyday Russians' ability to lead traditional family lives.
However, what's key here is to observe that EoV doesn't inherently dictate that the two factions will immediately turn on each other in mechanistic fashion.
Once Putin dies, there'll be an interim leader - whoever the immediate successor is under their [admittedly "mostly-honored-in-the-breach"] constitution. However long there is until the next election will determine how long that leader has to try to consolidate power using the state apparatus Putin has assembled. If there's a leader in the intelligence services who's particularly ambitious, they'll have a decent shot at temporarily securing power, though it might backfire on them - Putin was always an outlier among KBG alums in terms of his savvy at electoral politics. Medvedev may attempt a comeback as well, ushering Putin's United Russia into a new marriage between oligarchs and liberals, and ceding the church's support to Navalny, with the main electoral fight being over who gets to claim the mantle of nationalism. Regardless, the entire next election will basically hinge on how well the establishment is able to hold Alexei Navalny at bay - whether through outright assassination, propaganda suppression, or -- gasp -- honest retail politics!! (lol)
Basically, though, Russia won't have much of a constitutional crisis per se; it's just that the major institutions of state will be temporarily up for grabs - media, parliament, the security services, the oligarchs, the church, nationalism.
The only chance for a real "breakup" is if the various federally autonomous regions like Siberia seize the opportunity to demand *more* autonomy; however, absent Putin sucking up all the political oxygen in the room, they're just as likely to see if they can finally gain a foothold in Russia's core institutions. They're equally liable to join the church's or the oligarchs' side: the hinterlands are of course plenty traditional, but they may see the real route to power being with the oligarchs. They may even end up being the kingmaker faction; they won't have any formal party, so any coalition-formation negotiations will occur before/during the election as their leading candidates and/or incumbents for the Duma declare for either side.
That's the best I can figure, at least.